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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
August 13, 2014

Abuse of Property Right Without Political
Foundations: A Response to Katz
Mitchell N. Berman
Suppose that Oliver owns Blackacre, a parcel adjacent to Whiteacre,
owned by Teresa. Oliver erects a large sculpture on Blackacre along the shared
property line. The sculpture conforms to zoning regulations. But Oliver erects
it in order to block Teresa’s access to light. Is he legally entitled to do so?
Common law jurisdictions standardly hold that he is: property law does
not inquire into an owner’s motives or reasons for exercising his property
rights.1 Put differently, the scope of property rights is generally thought to be
insensitive to an owner’s motives or reasons. Larissa Katz maintains that this
black letter rule, put so starkly, is neither faithful to the case law nor
normatively attractive. In her recent article, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional
Principle of Abuse of Property Right,2 Katz elaborates and defends a general
principle of abuse of property right—a principle that would judge Oliver’s
conduct to be abusive.3
I argue in this Essay that Katz is broadly right about abuse of property
right—but for the wrong reason. Katz grounds her abuse-of-right principle in a
particular theory of property ownership. Her account is therefore (and
avowedly) particular to the use and abuse of property rights; it does not arise
from principles that are general to other legal departments nor does it bear
implications for the resolution of other legal problems. That, I contend, is a
mistake—and a costly one. By rooting the plausible principle that she favors in

1.

A locus classicus is Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.).

2.

Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 Yale
L.J. 1444 (2013).

3.

What “abusive” means and whether it is equivalent to “impermissible” or “illegal” is not
entirely clear. On one hand, Katz explains that “a principle of abuse of property right makes
sense of a range of judicial responses to spiteful or extortionate uses of ownership. This
single principle can illuminate remedial tinkering (e.g., substituting damages for
injunctions), denying the right to exclude, and even treating the abusive behavior as itself a
nuisance.” Id. at 1449 (footnote omitted). I take this to suggest that “abusive” is not
equivalent to “impermissible from the legal point of view.” On the other hand, Katz’s
apparent agreement that it is paradoxical for it to be true both that one has a legal right to φ
and that one’s φing is abusive legally speaking, see infra note 20, suggests a contrary
position.
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property-specific grounds that prove highly doubtful, Katz obscures from view
any possible consilience among the abuse-of-property principle and kindred
legal principles outside the property arena. I aim to bring those connections to
the surface.
Part I summarizes Katz’s account. Part II criticizes one of its two main
components: Katz’s novel theory of ownership. Part III introduces the
unsurprising suggestion that property doctrines that police abusive exercise of
property rights are products of general moral principles against purposefully or
knowingly harming others, and observes that Katz is likely to eschew this
straightforward defense of abuse of property right on the ground that it is
“external” and for that reason less promising or valuable than the “internal”
account that she favors. Part III argues, however, that Katz’s apparent reasons
for disfavoring external limits on property rights are unpersuasive. Part IV
bolsters the credentials of an external reasons-based restriction on exercise of
property rights by sketching deep similarities among abuse of property,
informational blackmail, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
i. k a t z in b r ie f
Katz’s argument has two main components. The first is an account and
endorsement of a particular construal of the principle of abuse of property
right. According to the principle Katz defends, an owner abuses her property
rights with respect to a thing she owns if she makes an otherwise permitted
decision about how to use the thing solely in order to harm others, either as an
end in itself (“spite”) or as a means to induce others to act as the owner desires
(“leverage”). This is a substantive claim about the limits of a property owner’s
rights. I will call it the “No-Intent-To-Harm Principle,” or “the NITH
Principle,” for short.
The second component of Katz’s argument is a defense or grounding of
that principle in a normative political-theoretical account of ownership.
Property ownership is always morally problematic, Katz contends, because
“[w]hen someone is granted ownership authority to determine the agenda for
her property, she is then in a position to make decisions that bind us all,”4
thereby impinging on the autonomy of others. But we cannot insist that
nobody make such decisions, for that would entail that nobody could use
anything. “We thus have reason to authorize someone to make decisions about
things on behalf of the rest of us in order to avoid a dilemma.”5 The institution
of property ownership emerges as a response to that dilemma, or that
coordination problem, and does so by assigning to individuals authority to

4.

Id. at 1450.

5.

Id. at 1478 (emphasis omitted).
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resolve what Katz terms “the Basic Question”: “what (in their view) constitutes
a worthwhile use of a thing.”6 I will call this defense of the institution of
property ownership “the Ownership Theory.” Not only does it justify the
introduction of property rights, it also sets limits on their scope. “A principle of
abuse of property right simply marks the limit of that jurisdiction” that we
have good reason to confer.7
In short, then, Katz advances the following two claims:
The No-Intent-To-Harm Principle: an owner acts abusively (i.e., runs afoul
of limitations that are built into the property rights she purports to exercise) if
she uses a thing for the purpose of causing harm to another.
The Ownership Theory: the legal-political institution of property rights is
justified by, and only by, a society’s need to assign jurisdiction to answer the
“Basic Question” of what is a worthwhile use of a thing.
In addition, Katz grounds the No-Intent-To-Harm Principle in the
Ownership Theory. The No-Intent-To-Harm principle is true only in virtue of
the Ownership Theory. “The reason” for the principle of abuse of property
right, Katz maintains, “lies in the political foundations of the office of
ownership itself.”8
ii. t h e o w n e r s h ip t h e o r y : s o m e d o u b t s
There are at least two reasons to doubt Katz’s theory of the institution of
ownership. First, Katz’s theory—the Ownership Theory—supports a broader
limitation on the scope of property rights than the NITH Principle
contemplates, and one that is considerably less plausible. Second, aside from its
dubious upshot, the Ownership Theory puts forth an implausibly narrow
picture of the problem that the institution of ownership is designed to resolve
and of its point or value.
A. The Uncertain Relevance of Harmful Intent
Katz does not purport to offer a sustained defense of the Ownership
Theory, and what arguments she does present for that theory are highly

6.

Id. at 1450.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.
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telegraphic.9 But I suspect that many readers who find NITH plausible (or
more than plausible) will take that plausibility to be good evidence in favor of
the Ownership Theory. Of course, it would be fallacious to deduce the truth of
the Ownership Theory from the (supposed) truth of NITH. Still, one might
think this a sensible abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation.
I think, to the contrary, that the plausibility of NITH furnishes very weak
support for the Ownership Theory. The problem is that the Ownership Theory
actually entails that an owner’s use of a thing that is motivated by idiosyncratic
reasons unconnected to judgments about “what would be a worthwhile use” of
that thing is abusive even if those reasons do not involve intent to cause harm. As
Katz explains: “where the owner fails to take herself to be determining what
constitutes a worthwhile use of a thing, she abuses her position of authority
and either loses the law’s full protection or, in some cases, even attracts
sanction.”10 This being so, the abuse-of-property principle that the Ownership
Theory delivers does not proscribe a limited set of purposes (namely, intent to
cause harm), but rather prescribes the reasons that must motivate property
usage (namely, reasons that rest on judgments about what would be a
worthwhile use or agenda for the property). The principle is better rendered,
not as “No-Intent-To-Harm” (NITH), but as “Worthwhile-Uses-Only”
(WUO). WUO implies NITH, but is much broader than NITH.
A hypothetical example will make the difference between WUO and NITH
clearer and demonstrate its significance.
Green House
Oswald was preparing to repaint his white house yellow. Before doing
so, however, Oswald’s neighbor, Ned, volunteered how attractive he’d
find Oswald’s house were it yellow. Oswald hates Ned. So he paints
his house green.
Here are two plausible observations about Green House. First, if, as most
theorists believe, harm is a moralized or evaluative concept that is not reducible

9.

The heart of the Ownership Theory is the claim that “the reason owners have standing [to
impose on others private decisions about things] is to perform a coordination function that
all of us have reason to accept,” conjoined with both a view about precisely what that
coordination function is, and a supposed moral principle that ownership authority must be
constrained “to its narrowest scope consistent with discharging the coordination function.”
Id. at 1472 (emphasis added). Defending all this is the burden of Part II.B, which covers
something less than a page and a half.

10.

Id. at 1482.
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to the mere non-provision of a benefit,11 then Oswald’s intent is only to
withhold from Ned a benefit, not to inflict harm. Ned is not remotely likely to
experience a setback to interests of the character or magnitude necessary to
amount to a harm, on the most plausible accounts of that concept, and we have
no basis to conclude that Oswald believed or intended otherwise.
Second, and nonetheless, Oswald’s decision did not involve a judgment
about what would be a worthwhile “use” of his home. Having identified a
range of color choices that he would deem acceptable—or “worthwhile,”
whatever that might mean, exactly—Oswald made a decision regarding the
property he owns on the strength of only a single consideration: what color
would be least likely to please his neighbor. Unless a use is necessarily
“worthwhile” just so long as the owner has some reason for favoring it—a
construal of “worthwhile” that would render the Basic Question entirely
toothless—we should conclude that Oswald’s reasons for acting were not in
keeping with the reasons why owners are granted authority to make decisions
that “bind us all.”
If these two judgments are correct, and if NITH fully constituted Katz’s
abuse-of-property principle, then Oswald did not abuse his property rights—a
conclusion that probably jibes with most people’s intuitions. But because Katz
believes that the jurisdiction of a property owner extends only so far as she is
answering the Basic Question, and because “[a] principle of abuse of property
right simply marks the limits of that jurisdiction,”12 it must follow that Oswald
did abuse his rights, for “[a]n owner exceeds her jurisdiction whenever her
reasons for acting do not concern what she thinks is a worthwhile use of her
property.”13 Or, again, “it is an abuse of right to exercise ownership authority
for reasons other than the task with which owners are charged.”14 If the
conclusion that Oswald’s action was ultra vires strikes you as implausible
(regardless of whether you could muster good institutional or “pragmatic”
reasons why no concrete legal consequences should attach), then you have
reason to resist the Ownership Theory.
Admittedly, this is not a decisive objection. You might find it more
plausible than I do that Oswald’s conduct is abusive and that, as a result, he
sacrifices some measure of “the law’s full protection.” Or perhaps Oswald
doesn’t run afoul of the Worthwhile-Use-Only Principle because his reasoning
did, in some respect, concern what is a worthwhile use. I do not know how that
argument would run, largely because Katz is surprisingly silent about what is
11.

See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-36 (1984). Because Katz does not elaborate
on the notion of harm in her essay, there is no way of knowing what conception of harm she
means to employ.

12.

Katz, supra note 2, at 1450.

13.

Id. at 1464.

14.

Id. at 1465.
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involved in making a judgment about a worthwhile use,15 but I wouldn’t rule it
out as impossible.
In case you are tempted by either of these outs, consider a second
hypothetical. This is a little more fanciful than Green House, but even less
susceptible to either of the two avenues of escape I have just identified.
Vase in Box
Oscar owns a vase that he keeps on his mantle. He enjoys looking at
it. One day, Oscar’s drunken friend, Fred, dares him to put it away.
Why? “Just because,” says Fred. Not one to back off from a
challenge, Oscar locks the vase in a box and stores it on a high shelf
in his closet.
Surely Oscar’s locking his vase away harms nobody. Indeed, it is not clear
that this case even involves the withholding of a benefit. (Oscar rarely
entertains, and the few friends who have seen the vase think it ugly.) If NITH
defines the scope of abuse of property right, then Oscar’s conduct is
permissible and non-abusive. And yet Oscar is not motivated by a belief that
locking the vase away in a box in his closet is “a worthwhile use” of it.16 The
notion that such-and-such a use would be worthwhile is supposed to be an
input to a decision regarding what to do with a thing, not an output. That is,
an owner should opt for use φ as a consequence of a judgment that φ is a
worthwhile use; she should not judge use φ to be worthwhile in consequence
of a decision to undertake φ. Given that the Ownership Theory actually
supports the broader principle Worthwhile-Uses-Only, and not only the
narrower principle No-Intent-To-Harm, Oscar’s act of locking away his own
vase would not fall within the scope of his property rights—if the Ownership
Theory is sound.
But surely Oscar’s property rights in the vase fully entitle him to lock it in a
box in his closet. If that is true—and its truth does not depend upon there
15.

Although I do not pursue the matter further given space constraints, I confess to finding this
silence troubling. And Katz’s observation (made twice) that “reasons that go beyond the
thing itself are ultra vires,” id. at 1472, 1479, does not clarify matters for me. Given the
instrumental uses to which things are put, I do not know what is included in the set of
reasons that extend only to “the thing itself,” and thus what is excluded. The image that
most clearly emerges to me is that an owner should structure her practical reasoning such
that she first poses the Basic Question with respect to each thing she owns and then guides
her conduct in response to whatever answers she furnishes. But this proposal strikes me as
so transparently unpromising that I doubt it is Katz’s, hence my puzzlement.

16.

Katz takes pains to allow that an owner may defer to another’s judgment about worthwhile
uses. Id. at 1459-63. This is not such a case: Fred did not believe that secreting the vase away
would be a worthwhile use of it.
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being a categorical and unqualified right to waste—then the Ownership Theory
is not sound.
B. The Uncertain Relevance of “the Basic Question”
My second worry about the Ownership Theory is more direct and more
fundamental: people rarely make decisions regarding how to use their property
on the basis that Katz’s theory supposes. Katz assumes that, absent property
rights, we disagree among ourselves regarding “what is a worthwhile use” of
some thing. Because that is the problem that the institution of ownership is
designed to resolve, that is the question that owners are charged to address. An
owner exceeds her jurisdiction when establishing an agenda for a thing she
owns based on any other considerations.
Now, I am skeptical that the institution of property is best justified or
explained in terms of any single value or need. My inclinations here are
pluralist.17 But put that aside. Assuming arguendo that the institution of
property law is justified by a single value, or is responsive to a concern that
could be usefully formulated as a single “Basic Question,” that single question
is almost certainly not “what is a worthwhile use of this thing?” That form of
question seeks to elicit the wrong sort of judgment. Members of a community
can frequently agree regarding what is a worthwhile use of a given thing—this
would be worthwhile, that would be worthwhile, the other would be
worthwhile too. The problem is not that of deciding whether a given proposed
use is or is not “worthwhile.” The problem (or a large part of it) is that we
cannot make use of a thing in all the ways that qualify as worthwhile. We must
choose from among the set of worthwhile uses. The problem is a practical
one—it concerns what to do—not a theoretical one concerning what to believe.
This is not a quibble. Katz conceives of ownership as an institution devoted
almost exclusively to solving the theoretical problem that we have divergent
views regarding what is or is not “worthwhile.” Such an orientation leads her
to emphasize “the importance of enabling the office of ownership to serve as a
clearinghouse for ideas about the use of things.”18 But she overlooks the fact
that even a single person’s judgments about this matter of evaluative fact will
often underdetermine an answer to the question she confronts—namely, what
is to be done. As a consequence, Katz’s narrow focus upon her “Basic
Question” obscures from view the extent to which property rights, by allowing
owners to make choices and carry out plans, enable us to refine and satisfy our

17.

Those inclinations are considerably strengthened by the powerful and nuanced defense of a
pluralist theory of property institutions put forth in HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES
AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).

18.

Katz, supra note 2, at 1462 (emphasis added).
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preferences, hone our talents and capacities, and exert our wills upon the
world. We constitute ourselves in part by exercising our wills free from
interference by others, and property rights play a significant role in that project
of self-constitution.
One might try to moot the challenge I have just raised by simply reframing
the Basic Question from “what is a worthwhile use of this thing?” to “what is
the most worthwhile use of this thing?” Indeed, a few passages suggest that
this is what Katz really had in mind all along. For example, when discussing a
decision that enjoined as a nuisance a property owner’s noisemaking conducted
in order to pressure a neighboring couple to stop their own music playing, Katz
approves the result on the grounds that “[t]he question [the defendant] put to
himself was not how best to use his property, but rather how most effectively
to force the plaintiffs to cease their musical enterprises.”19 Plausibly, “how best
should this property be used?” is roughly equivalent to “what is this property’s
most worthwhile use?”
This hoped-for fix would not solve the problem I am raising. Preliminarily,
as a matter of Katz exegesis, the idea that the Basic Question an owner must
answer is only whether some use is a worthwhile one, and not whether it is the
most worthwhile, does not appear to be an accident or oversight. The exact
phrase “a worthwhile use” appears over twenty times in an article of fewer than
forty pages. More substantively, to demand that owners base their usedecisions on judgments about what would be most worthwhile or optimal
would be a recipe for paralysis. It is unavoidable that we frequently must act in
the face of options that we cannot rank order on any remotely objective metric
such as “worthwhileness.” This is true whether the decision involves how to
use our things or how to spend the weekend. Moreover, many theorists would
prize this state of affairs, not bemoan it. People’s inability to resolve all
questions of what to do by the exercise of judgment facilitates the development
of our individuality as willing agents. We become who we are in part by
choosing life projects and embarking on courses of action that the demands of
rationality alone do not, as it were, select for us.
iii. g r o u n d in g a n a b u s e o f p r o p e r t y r ig h t : o f in t e r n a l
a n d e x t e r n a l lim it s
If Katz’s Ownership Theory is doubtful as a political justification for the
institution of property ownership, then it cannot feature in a defense of the
NITH Principle. But this would not entail that the NITH Principle (or a close
analogue) is false, for it could rest on other grounds. Here is a straightforward
possibility: first, it is morally wrong (pro tanto) to cause harm to another

19.

Id. at 1464.
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knowingly; and second, our law adopts or accommodates that moral principle,
allowing it to help shape the contours of legal rights.
Although it is not absolutely clear what reason Katz might have for
rejecting or disfavoring this alternative proposal, a possible explanation can be
teased out of her announced preference for an “internal” rather than “external”
restriction on property rights. Katz does not quite define “internal” or external”
limits, but the distinction appears to be, roughly, that the former are supplied
by the very reasons or considerations that affirmatively justify the institution of
property ownership, whereas the latter arise from general moral or legal
principles that are not particular to property law and theory but cut across legal
departments. In several places, Katz announces that an internal limitation is
preferable or superior to an external one.20
If my first pass at the internal/external distinction is roughly accurate, then
it would seem that the (wholly unremarkable) proposal I am floating—that
property rights are in some measure circumscribed by moral principles against
harming others—falls on the external side of the line.21 What remains unclear is
what is not to like about external limits.
As best I can tell, Katz offers only one argument against externally
generated limits on property rights or their exercise: that a restriction on
property rights must be internal to avoid the paradox that, at the same time,
one can have a right to φ, and one’s doing φ could be “abusive” hence
impermissible.22 Katz is right to want to avoid that odd or paradoxical
conclusion. But this desideratum does not foreclose external restrictions. Katz
offers no reason why the contours of specific legal rights, including the specific
legal rights that collectively define the set of “property rights,” cannot be set by
the interplay between reasons, values, or principles that provide affirmative

20.

Katz particularly emphasizes both the difference between internal and external limits and
her preference for the former when contrasting her analysis and defense of abuse of property
right with accounts offered by Ernest Weinrib, Daniel Kelly, Joseph Perillo, and Henry
Smith. See id. at 1447 n.5 (allowing that these other scholars have offered “valuable
perspectives on the problems of spite and extortion,” but observing that “they assume a
certain normative framework that incompletely accounts for the internal limits on
ownership authority,” and further contending that “it is important to consider abuse of
property right specifically in light of the idea of ownership and so apart from its analogues
in other areas of law”).

21.

There is a possible intimation in Katz that it is definitional, and not merely illustrative, of an
external approach that it “balance[s] harm against social utility.” Id. at 1456. My suggestion
that NITH or something like it reflects the legalization of a moral principle against harming
others would not qualify as external on this definition. But then it would be even harder to
see what reason Katz provides for resisting it.

22.

Id. at 1456 & n.34. To be clear, the notion that rights are sometimes exercised “abusively” is
not itself hard to accept. A paradox seems to arise only insofar as such abusive exercise is not
permitted by the lights of the very same normative system that purports to recognize the
right in question.
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support for some such right and competing or opposing reasons, values, or
principles, even of a very general character.
Indeed, an external restriction on property rights grounded in general
moral principles can probably perform the function that Katz wants a principle
of abuse of property right to serve better than her preferred internal approach
does. Katz emphasizes that a principle of abuse of property right is just that—a
principle.23 Because, as Dworkin famously taught, principles have a dimension
of weight,24 the abuse-of-property-right principle can shape different doctrinal
responses in different property contexts. In some contexts, an owner is barred
from using her property for the purpose of harming another; other times such
use is permitted but will not be aided by the full panoply of judicial remedies
that a property owner can usually call upon. This state of affairs is just what to
expect if the abuse-of-right principle in property law were, in essence, the
partial legalization of a moral principle against harming others. It is less clear
that Katz’s internal approach can similarly generate a limitation that functions
as a principle. Katz’s limitation on property rights arises from the claimed fact
that the reasons alone capable of supporting property institutions simply run
out. As she explains, “we must constrain . . . ownership authority to its
narrowest scope consistent with discharging the coordination function. That is
why reasons that go beyond the thing itself are ultra vires.”25 That is also why
she dubs her approach not only “internal,” but also “jurisdictional.” But if
owners lack lawful power to use their things for the purpose of harming others,
then it is unclear what allows for the context-sensitivity that Katz endorses.26
Jurisdictional norms are generally understood to take the form of rules, not of
principles.
iv . b e y o n d p r o p e r t y
Let us leave property law for the moment and consider the criminal law. If
you know (counterfactually!) that I am having an affair, you may tell my wife.
I am not (absent other facts) legally or morally entitled to your silence, and you
are not legally or morally obligated to keep mum. Yet if you offer me your
silence on condition that I pay $10,000, you have committed the legal and
moral wrong denominated “blackmail.” How it can be wrongful to threaten
what one has a right to do has confounded criminal law scholars, moral

23.

See supra note 3.

24.

See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978).

25.

Katz, supra note 2, at 1479.

26.

See, e.g., id. at 1449.
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philosophers, and economists for generations.27 I believe that a solution to this
puzzle will both lend support to the notion that rights, including property
rights, are sometimes circumscribed by an actor’s reasons for action, and help
us think through the precise content of the abuse-of-property principle.
My proposed solution to the puzzle has two components: a claim about the
scope of our expressive rights, and a claim about the probative value of a
conditional offer of silence.28 First, I deny that the action that a blackmailer
threatens is something that, categorically, he has a right to do. On my view, the
correct principle governing the permissible scope of criminal libel is roughly
this: a person exceeds or “abuses” her rights by disclosing information that she
foresees will be harmful to another’s reputation unless she genuinely believes
that the balance of morally relevant considerations renders the disclosure
justified all things considered.
Of course, it will ordinarily be hard to know upon which beliefs and
motives someone acted when revealing reputation-harming information about
another. That’s where the second piece of my preferred analysis comes in. The
fact of a prior conditional offer of silence is frequently good evidence
(depending upon many particulars, of course) that the subsequent disclosure,
made after the conditional offer is rebuffed, is not animated by a bona fide
belief that it is morally warranted despite the harm it will cause. Assuredly, this
is not a deduction. It is an inference and thus necessarily defeasible. Its
strength will be highly context-sensitive But putting the epistemic challenge
aside, the key claim remains that if a blackmailer threatens to disclose
information that he would understand to be harmful and that he would not
believe to be morally justified by the balance of reasons, then what he threatens
is not within his rights to carry out. It is sometimes said that blackmail
criminalizes actions that one has a “perfect right” to do.29 That is precisely
what my solution to the blackmail paradox denies. Reasons matter.
Does this account of blackmail’s proper criminalization suggest that
property rights too are sensitive to an owner’s reasons for using her property
this way or that? Katz rightly notes that “[o]wnership is generally seen as

27.

For a rich sampling of commentary, see Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565-1989
(1993).

28.

See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 37 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary
Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998) [hereinafter,
Berman, The Evidentiary Theory]. Although I believe that my account of blackmail has
gained more support than any competing account, I fully acknowledge that it is far from
having achieved the status of settled wisdom.

29.

See, e.g., Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass’n, [1937] A.C. 797, 806 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (“The ordinary blackmailer normally threatens to do what he has a perfect right to
do—namely, communicate some compromising conduct to a person whose knowledge is
likely to affect the person threatened.”).
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conferring a bargaining chip. . . . An owner is in a position to sell an easement,
a license to use or to access her property, or a promise to forbear from an
undesirable activity.”30 But forbearance from an undesirable activity is precisely
what a blackmailer offers. Usually that undesirable activity is the
communication of embarrassing information, but it could be something else:
“informational blackmail” is not redundant and “noninformational blackmail”
is not oxymoronic.31 The leverage cases that interest Katz, then, are not
analogous to blackmail; they are blackmail.
Notice, though, that my account of blackmail endorses a limitation on the
exercise of the right to reveal secrets that is somewhat more constraining than
the NITH Principle that Katz favors. NITH constrains owners’ authority to use
their property for the purpose of causing harm to others. On my account of
blackmail, an “owner” of information exceeds her rights of disclosure when she
foresees that doing so will cause harm, unless she believes that the disclosure is
morally warranted, all things considered. Perhaps my account is mistaken. But
if it is correct, does it teach that the exercise of rights in tangible property is
likewise constrained by a principle more biting than NITH—that is, by a
knowledge-based constraint, not a purpose-based one?
Not necessarily. Recall my suggestion that property rights might be shaped
in part by moral principles that enjoin us not to harm others. If moral
principles contribute to the contours of property rights but do not, all by
themselves, determine the rights’ contours, then we should expect the precise
contours of property rights to be sensitive to the particular considerations that
nourish or give rise to rights regarding property in the first place. Put another
way, the precise reasons for which an exercise of a given right should be
deemed abusive or not within the right’s scope are partially but not fully
determined by domain-specific considerations. It is plausibly part of the
purpose or value of property rights that they serve to demarcate domains of
unusually robust freedom of action. Therefore, NITH might indeed cabin the
exercise of property rights—or of some of them—even if reason-based
limitations on the exercise of other rights are more restrictive than NITH itself.
Whether that is so or not, the important point is that the external account I
favor highlights a deep connection between abuse of property right
and informational blackmail that Katz’s account, due its internal or
“jurisdictional” character, cannot see. Furthermore, the external account
sensitizes us to the possibility that NITH-like principles apply elsewhere too.
Consider constitutional law. The unconstitutional conditions problem
arises whenever the state offers a benefit (i.e., some goodie the provision of
which is not constitutionally required) on condition that the recipient waive
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some constitutional protection or exercise a right in a manner that the state
could not mandate. Famously, this problem arises across the constitutional
spectrum. For example, government offers welfare funds on condition that
recipients waive specified Fourth Amendment protections; land use bodies
offer zoning variances on condition that property owners relinquish particular
property rights or grant easements that the state could not command (without
paying just compensation); prosecutors offer reduced sentences or charges on
condition that defendants waive their rights to plead not guilty and to put the
prosecution to its burden of proof. These and similar offers describe a problem
or puzzle because the universal agreement that some such proposals are
unconstitutional is in tension with the widespread intuition that if what is
offered is indeed a “benefit” that the government need not provide, then it may
be withheld for any reason at all.
That latter intuition, however, parallels what is said in the informational
blackmail cases—namely, that one’s right to disclose embarrassing information
about another entails that one may disclose the information for any reason—
and is equally fallacious. It is far more plausible, I have argued elsewhere, that
the state may not withhold a benefit for the purpose of making exercise of a
constitutional right more costly, either to punish the rightholder for exercising
her right in a way that the state disfavors or to deter other similarly situated
rightholders from doing so. To do so—that is, to treat a rightholder less well
for exercising her right than one otherwise would, in order to raise the cost of
that exercise—is to “penalize” exercise of the right, and it is concomitant to the
existence of a constitutional right that the correlative duty-holder not penalize
its exercise. Put another way, what we may fairly call “the anti-penalty
principle” holds that the state may not take the anticipated fact that some
action (here, nonprovision of a benefit) would make exercise of a right more
costly as a reason to favor that action.32
Take a highly unrealistic example. Surely it would be unconstitutional for
the state to condition eligibility for school lunches on the commitment of a
child’s mother not to have an abortion. Why? A quick answer is that there is no
nexus or germaneness between the benefit and the condition. But germaneness
is better understood as an evidentiary tool, not as a constitutional requirement.
The conditional provision of a benefit would be unconstitutional because if the
state were to withhold the offered benefit on failure of the stated condition,
then it would be acting for the purpose of making exercise of the abortion right
more costly, not merely acting with the knowledge that nonprovision of the
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benefit would make exercise of the abortion right more costly. Lack of
germaneness between condition and offered benefit is significant in practical
terms because and insofar as it helps license the inference that, when it
proceeds to withhold the benefit on failure of condition, the state would be
doing so not despite the fact that withholding would raise the costs of exercising
a right, but because of it.
This is just the heart of a solution to the unconstitutional conditions
problem, not the full account, which could not be elaborated and defended in
this short space.33 The point of importance is that the anti-penalty principle at
the heart of the analysis mirrors, almost precisely, the NITH principle that
Katz invokes to circumscribe the exercise of property rights. Owners, says Katz,
may not use their property for the purpose of harming others, either because
they value the harm as a good in itself or for the further purpose of
incentivizing others to act as the owner wishes. Governments, according to the
solution to the unconstitutional conditions problem on offer, may not threaten
to withhold benefits for the purpose of raising the cost of exercising
constitutional rights, either because the government treats exercise of the right
as a wrong that warrants punishment or for the further purpose of
incentivizing other rightholders to acquiesce in the government’s demands.34
Our law’s concern for reasons for action runs broader and deeper than courts
and commentators generally acknowledge. Katz’s defense of a principle of
abuse of property is therefore a useful corrective. It would be more valuable
still, as well as more secure, if the principle were rooted in more general,
“external” considerations than in a highly doubtful analysis of property law’s
foundations.
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